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We analyze panel data for 40 countries over the period 1970-2000 to examine the effect of social 
security reforms on the labor supply of older men. The data show a trend towards earlier 
retirement that can be explained by rising income levels. We find that the average retirement age 
rises significantly when the normal, or early, social security eligibility age rises, the pension 
benefits for postponing retirement are increased, or the system shifts from defined benefits to 
defined contributions. A package of social security reforms is capable of substantially increasing 
the labor supply of older men.   
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 1. Introduction 
 
Longer lifespans and aging populations are putting pressure on the retirement systems of many 
countries. The compression of morbidity and delay in the onset of disability mean that old people 
today are healthier than in previous generations, which, in theory, allows them longer working 
lives. However, male old-age labor force participation has fallen rapidly over the past several 
decades, triggering a policy debate about how to maintain the solvency of social security 
systems. An important issue in debating potential solutions is the magnitude of the labor supply 
response to social security reforms.   
  In this paper, we use new data on social security systems from 40 high- and middle-
income countries over the period 1970-2000 to estimate the effect of changes in social security 
systems on male labor force participation and the average retirement age. In a world with 
complete markets and actuarially fair social security systems, expected benefits would perfectly 
match contributions, so that social security contributions should not have any direct influence on 
labor market decisions (Cremer et al., 2006b, Stock and Wise, 1990). However, most social 
security systems are not actuarially fair, and their rules lead to large incentive effects that 
significantly influence retirement decisions (Gruber and Wise, 2004). These systems can lead to 
little or no financial incentive to continue working beyond the social security retirement age, and 
only those with strong preferences for working continue to do so (Blondal and Scarpetta, 1999).   
  Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) document the effect of social security systems on male 
retirement in a group of high income countries, and show that in each country retirement peaks at 
exactly the ages at which the retirement incentives are strongest. However, their approach is 
static in the sense that it analyzes labor force behavior in each country at only one point in time. 
From a policy perspective, it may be more important to consider how reforms of a social security 
system within a country affect retirement behavior over time. To investigate this issue we 
estimate male labor supply equations for the age groups 50-54, 55–59, 60–64 and 65+ in a five-
year panel for 40 countries over the period 1970-2000. The use of panel data allows us to 
estimate the effects of changes in social security arrangements over time within countries. 
  In our analysis, we find a large downward trend in the labor supply of older males. 
Economic growth and rising wage rates generate both income and substitution effects on labor 
supply. Higher wages encourage work at the margin, but a higher lifetime income generates a 
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in labor supply as income rise.   
  We also investigate the effect of social security arrangements on male labor supply. We 
define five indicators that describe the institutional features of social security systems in a given 
country and point of time for each cohort
2. Social security can affect different workers very 
differently depending on their level of earnings and pattern of labor supply.  We base our 
measures on the social security legislation as it would apply to a representative worker who starts 
school at age 6 and leaves school to start work after receiving the cohort average years of 
schooling, and then works continuously at average earnings until he decides to retire.    
  We construct five measures to capture the social security system. The first is the social 
security eligibility age, the age at which a worker becomes eligible for full benefits. The second 
measure is the number of years before the eligibility age that early retirement, at reduced 
benefits, is allowed. The third is the increase in benefits that a worker gains from a year of work 
past the eligibility age.  Our final two measures capture the replacement rate, the percentage of 
average earnings replaced by the pension if the worker retires at the normal eligibility age. We 
measure the replacement rate from the defined benefit portion of a scheme separately from 
replacement that accrues from defined contributions.    
The results from our empirical analysis imply that raising the social security eligibility or 
"normal" retirement age, or reducing the number of early retirement years allowed, significantly 
increase the labor market participation of older men. We find that raising the eligibility age for 
retirement by one year increases the average retirement age by about two months. This estimate 
is somewhat smaller that the six month effect estimated from recent increases in the eligibility 
age in the United States (Mastrobuoni, 2009). A one year delay in the option of early retirement 
increases the estimated average age of retirement by a slightly smaller margin. Raising the bonus 
for delaying retirement past the normal retirement age also increases the average age of 
retirement, by just under one month for each one-percentage point increase in the replacement 
rate per year of extra work.   
  We find that the effect of the replacement rate on retirement is very different in defined 
contribution and defined benefit schemes. In defined benefit schemes, raising the replacement 
                                                 
2 Social security laws at a point in time often treat cohorts differently; for example a law may only apply to men 
born after a certain year.  
  2rate tends to reduce the labor supply for older men. In defined contribution schemes, raising the 
replacement rate increases the labor supply. Our model predicts that a shift from a defined 
benefit to a defined contribution scheme, with the same expected replacement rate, should lead to 
a substantial increase in the retirement age. For a country like the United States, with a 
replacement rate of around 50%, we predict an increase in the average age at retirement of about 
2 years if the United States were to switch from a defined benefit to a defined contribution 
scheme. We argue that in countries with defined benefit schemes and high replacement rates a 
package of reforms, increasing the social security eligibility age, reducing allowable early 
retirement, increasing incentives to keep working past the normal retirement age, and shifting 
from defined benefits to defined contributions, could increase men’s average age of retirement 
by about 5 years.    
These results complement a more general literature on the effects of social security 
systems. Social security systems can affect saving (Bloom et al., 2007, Zhang and Zhang, 2004), 
fertility decisions (Cremer et al., 2006a), labor supply (Burtless and Moffitt, 1985, Coile and 
Gruber, 2000, Krueger and Pischke, 1992), and economic growth (Ehrlich and Kim, 2005, Zhang 
and Zhang, 2004). Our results on the potential large effects of switching from a defined benefit 
to a defined contribution system complement those of Bloom and Canning (2007), who show a 
large effect of such a switch on national savings rates when the defined contributions system is 
fully funded. We do not address the issue of female labor supply, which follows a pattern very 
different from male labor supply (Bloom et al., 2009).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we discuss the data in section two of 
the paper and present the empirical results in section three. We conclude with a short summary 
and discussion of our main results. 
 
2. Data  
 
The dataset we use in our empirical work is an unbalanced five-year panel covering the 
period 1970-2000 in 40 middle- and high-income countries. The dependent variable in our 
empirical analysis is the male labor force participation rate. Labor market participation data are 
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) Bureau of Statistics (2007) and are based on 
national labor market surveys and censuses. The participation rate for a given age group is the 
number of economically active individuals divided by the total population of that group. Those 
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(ILO Bureau of Statistics, 2007). We use participation rates for the five-year age groups 50-54, 
55-59, 60–64, and for the male population age 65 and older. We use labor supply by age to infer 
the average retirement age. 
Our main interest is in the effect of the social security system.  Data on social security 
systems are coded from the Social Security Administration’s “Social Security Programs 
Throughout the World.”
3  This database originates from a survey conducted by the Social 
Security Administration to summarize the key features of national social security systems. The 
survey covers more than 150 countries from 1958 to 2007. We restrict our analysis to the high 
and upper-middle income countries that have a universal social security system, i.e., a system 
covering employees of all sectors in the country.
4 We exclude the formerly communist countries 
of Eastern Europe. These countries underwent substantial economic reforms in the 1990s, and it 
is difficult to disentangle the effect of social security reforms from larger changes in the labor 
market. We also exclude countries with populations less than one million. Many of these small 
countries have large numbers of migrant workers in their workforce, or a large part of their 
domestic population working abroad, which makes the calculation of participation rates 
problematic.
5 Table 1 lists the 40 countries that remain after this selection process that are used 
in our study. 
Our approach is to construct the social security rules that would pertain to a hypothetical 
representative worker. We assume that the hypothetical worker starts working at age 15, or at the 
age implied by starting school at age 6 and leaving after achieving the average schooling of the 
cohort, if the cohort average level of schooling exceeds 9 years. We assume that the 
representative worker is single and is continuously employed until retirement, and earns wages in 
each year equal to two thirds of the county’s GDP per capita.
6   
  Our first variable is the social security eligibility age, for full benefits, which we 
construct according to each country’s eligibility rules. Most social security systems allow 
retirement if a worker has reached a certain age or has made contributions for a specified number 
of years. In some countries, workers need to achieve both a certain age and a given number of 
                                                 
3 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
4 We count as “universal” systems that have separate rules for public sector and agricultural workers, though we use 
in our analysis only the system for the rest of the workforce.  
5 38 countries fall into this group, ranging from American Samoa and Andorra to Suriname and the Virgin Islands. 
6 Based on a labor share of 2/3, that is, the assumption that wages make up two thirds of GDP. 
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contributed to the pension system for a given number of years. We find the age at which our 
“representative” worker becomes eligible.  
The second social security variable is the number of years prior to the “normal” 
retirement age at which a worker can retire and still receive some social security benefits. Such 
early retirement typically comes with a lower pension. In some cases, countries allow earlier 
retirement for particular group of workers, e.g. miners. We assume that these special retirement 
clauses do not apply to our representative worker. 
Our third variable measures the incentive to postpone retirement. As discussed 
extensively in Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), retirement incentives come in many forms that 
generally translate into very high net effective tax rates on income earned once the worker passes 
a certain retirement age. Many pension systems do not adjust annual or monthly benefits at all if 
the worker decides to work and contribute beyond the social security eligibility rate, while other 
pension systems increase benefits in a more or less actuarially fair way.
7 The “deferred 
retirement bonus” variable we use in our empirical analysis captures the increase in social 
security pension, measured as a percentage point increase in the replacement rate, for each 
additional year of work. 
In addition to these three variables we calculate two measures of the social security 
system’s replacement rate for our representative worker if he retires when he reaches the normal 
eligibility age. The replacement rate is the annual pension received upon retirement as a 
percentage of his pre-retirement income. Distinguishing between the two broad types of pension 
systems, we calculate, for each country and each year, separate replacement rates from defined 
benefits and from defined contributions. In defined benefit systems, the pension levels are fixed 
by law; the pension level can be a fixed amount, or it can be dependent on the worker’s income, 
contributions, or years of work, or on a mix of these. We calculate the percentage of income the 
benefits would replace for our “representative” worker given the assumed wage rates and 
number of working years. 
In defined contribution systems, social security laws fix the amount which individuals 
have to contribute to their capital account. The pension is then paid from the invested 
                                                 
7 Postponing retirement at age 65 by one year should lead to an increase in pensions by about 6-10 percent, 
depending on the conditional life expectancy at age 65. 
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8 For fully funded systems we assume that the contributions 
in the fund earn the long-run risk-free rate of return of 3% per year (Campbell, 2001), and are 
paid out on retirement at an inflation-adjusted annuity rate of 5%, which reflects current market 
rates for single males at age 65 in the UK, a market where private annuities are widely traded.
9 
Because most defined contribution systems were introduced only recently, we use the 
contributions since the introduction of the system for our calculations. For workers who reach 
the normal retirement age shortly after the introduction of a defined contribution system, most of 
the pensions received come from their defined benefit, with a small contribution from their 
defined contributions. However, as time passes, a larger portion of the pension to retiring 
workers comes from the defined contribution element and a smaller portion from the defined 
benefit element.      
For countries that introduce new pension systems, older workers are sometimes kept on 
the existing system while new rules are gradually phased in for younger workers. In our coding, 
we align each cohort with the appropriate system, i.e., if the new rules do not apply to workers 
potentially retiring at a given period we use the old social security laws. This coding is not clear-
cut for countries (such as Chile or Argentina) that introduced new pension schemes and allowed 
some workers to choose between switching to the new scheme and remaining on the old scheme. 
In these cases we assume that all workers who get the choice between an old and a new system 
fall under the new system (as most eventually do), and calculate our measures accordingly.  
Our additional explanatory variables are: physical capital per working-age person, life 
expectancy, percentage of the population living in urban areas, average years of schooling of 
men in the age group, and, Life expectancy and urbanization data are from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006). We impute the physical capital stock based on the 
real capital investment rates from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006). To avoid 
potential simultaneity biases in the estimation, we deflate the capital stock by the working-age 
population rather than the number of workers. Our human capital measure is the average years of 
schooling of men in that five-year age group (Lutz et al., 2008, Lutz et al., 2007). The education 
                                                 
8 Most defined contribution systems are fully funded, but in theory the money either can be invested or may be 
placed in a notional account backed by the government. We treat these two as the same from the worker’s point of 
view. From a national savings perspective, however, these systems are very different, since  only a system in which 
contributions are actually invested will increase aggregate national savings.  
9 See, e.g. http://www.sharingpensions.co.uk/annuity_rates.htm#text1. 
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time window. 
  In Table 2 we report descriptive statistics on our dataset. Male labor force participation 
rates for 50-54 year olds average 90%, but fall rapidly for higher ages. The average social 
security eligibility age is 63 years, with a minimum of 50 and maximum of 70. Social security 
systems frequently allow early retirement, on average 2.3 years before the normal eligibility age. 
Most social security systems provide little incentive to work beyond the official retirement age, 
the average reward from delaying pension claims being a pension increase of only 1.1% of pre 
retirement wages. Average replacement rates in our sample are 59.6% from defined benefits and 
only 3.0% from defined contributions. Note, however, that few countries have defined 
contribution systems; the average replacement rate in systems that do have a defined contribution 
element is considerably higher at 29.2% and some of these countries also have a defined benefit 
part to their systems as well.  
Table 3 shows the social security variables we construct for the 40 countries in the study. 
We report these at ten-year intervals, though in our analysis we use a panel with data every five 
years. Although we have substantial variation in social security arrangements across countries, 
we are more interested in the effects of social security reform within countries. Every country in 
our sample has some variation in social security arrangements, some of them quite large.  
Some countries have simply increased the generosity of benefits by decreasing the 
eligibility age, allowing early retirement, or increasing the replacement rate. There are many 
examples of such changes. Finland increased its replacement rate substantially in the 1970s from 
42% to 60%, and in the 1980s started to allow early retirement by up to 5 years. France 
substantially increased replacement rates from 20% to 50% during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 2000 Greece increased the early retirement option from 2 to 7 years prior to 
the social security eligibility age. South Korea instituted early retirement in the 1990s, allowing 
up to 5 years. Luxembourg gradually increased the early retirement it allows, from 3 years in 
1970 to 8 years in 2000. Mauritius increased its replacement rate from 26% in 1980 to 58% in 
2000. Mexico increased its replacement rate in the 1970s, from 59% to 86%, and in the 1990s 
started to allow early retirement of up to 5 years. In the 1970s Panama granted the option of early 
retirement, up to 5 years, and increased the replacement rate from 69% to 100% but reduced the 
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Arabia gradually increased its replacement rate from zero in 1970 to 62% in 2000. 
By comparison, under financial strain many social security systems have made benefits 
less generous. In the 1990s Argentina increased its social security eligibility age from 60 to 64 
while Italy increased its normal eligibility age from 60 to 65.  Recent reforms in several 
European countries such as Austria, Germany, and Italy would also fall in this category, but are 
not captured in our data set which covers only reforms up to the year 2000. 
Another group of countries started to make their systems more generous, but then rolled 
back these changes. Costa Rica increased the allowed period of early retirement to 8 years in 
1980, and the replacement rate to 113% in 1990. However, by 2000 the period allowed for early 
retirement had fallen to 3 years, while the replacement rate had fallen to 87%. The deferral bonus 
in Costa Rica also fell from 5.6% per extra year worked in 1970 to 1.6% in 2000. Ireland 
reduced its social security eligibility age from 70 to 66 in the 1970s but then substantially 
reduced its replacement rate, from 66% to 33% in the 1990s. The Netherlands increased its 
replacement rate from 60% in 1970 to 87% in 1980 but it fell back to 51% by 2000. In the 1970s 
New Zealand reduced its normal retirement age from 65 to 60 while increasing its replacement 
rate from 48% to 87%; however, these changes were partially undone in the 1990s when it raised 
the normal retirement age to 64 and it had reduced the replacement rate to 66% by 2000. Spain 
increased its replacement rate in the 1970s from 50% to 100%, though it fell back to 86% during 
the 1980s; it also started to allow early retirement by up to 5 years in the 1990s.  
A small number of countries have focused on changes to early retirement and incentives 
to keep working. In the 1980s, Canada introduced early retirement of up to 5 years but also 
introduced a deferral incentive of 3% of pre-retirement income for each year worked past the 
normal retirement age. Denmark introduced a deferral bonus of 6.8% per extra year worked in 
the 1970s and then eliminated it in the 1980s. In the 1980s Japan increased its normal retirement 
age from 60 to 65, but allowed early retirement by up to 5 years, while substantially reducing the 
replacement rate from 95% to 67% and introducing a large deferral bonus, increasing the pension 
by 8% for each extra year worked.  
Two countries in our sample, Singapore and Malaysia, have relied exclusively on defined 
contribution schemes throughout the period. In 1970, these defined contribution systems 
provided relatively small replacement rates, primarily because workers retiring close to the start 
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for these countries are much larger, due partly to saving over the whole working life, and partly 
to increases in the mandated contribution rates. Two additional countries introduced defined 
contribution elements to their social security schemes in the 1980s, Chile and Switzerland, and 
four more did so in the 1990s – Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, and Denmark. For a worker 
reaching normal retirement age in 2000, however, the replacement rate from these defined 
contribution schemes is quite small due to their short period of operation.     
Table 4 reports averages of the social security variables for the 34 countries for which we 
have complete data over the period 1970-2000. Although Table 3 shows that in individual 
countries there have been quite large changes in social security, the average across countries has 
moved very little. The final column reports on the number of countries with defined contribution 
elements in their systems.    
Figure 1 shows the labor force participation rate for men aged 60-64 in 1970 and in 2000 
for all 40 countries in our sample. We see very wide variations in participation rates, across 
countries, from a low of less than 20% to a high of close to 90% in 2000. We also see a 
downward trend in participation rates over time, with participation being lower in 2000 than in 
1970 in most countries.  
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the evolution of male labor force participation rates and social 
security systems over the sample period for three countries: the United States, Chile, and France, 
respectively.  These graphs should be viewed in light of the overall worldwide trend towards 
lower participation over time shown in Figure 1.  In 1960 the United States had a social security 
eligibility age of 65 and a replacement rate of 46% from a defined benefit system. Up to 3 years 
of early retirement were allowed but there was no pension bonus from working after age 65. 
Over the period 1970-2000, there was a gradual increase in the deferral bonus to 3% in 2000, 
with only minor variations in the replacement rate. Labor force participation in the United States 
among 60-64 year olds and those over age 65 was declining before the introduction in the 
deferral bonus but the decline stopped and to some extent was reversed as the deferral bonus 
rose. Our data period does not cover the gradual increase in the social security eligibility age in 
the United States from 2000 onwards. 
Until 1980, Chile had a define benefit scheme with a replacement rate of 70%. Chile 
switched from a defined benefit system to a defined contribution system in 1981. Following the 
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nearly constant around 70% for 60-64 year olds – a trend quite different from most other 
countries in our sample. 
In 1970 France had an average replacement rate of only 20%. France witnessed a rapid 
increase in the replacement rate in its pension system between 1970 and 1985, with replacement 
rates increasing first to 25 and then in 1983 to 50%, though the deferral bonus was eliminated at 
the same time. France has experienced a rapid decline in male old age labor force participation; 
the fraction of males aged 60-64 participating in the labor force dropped from close to 60% in 
1970 to less than 20% in 2000. Our data shows a larger decline in participation than usual over 
the period 1980-85, which coincides with the reforms to the social security system that occurred.  
 
3. Empirical Specification and Results 
 
To analyze the effect of social security on male labor force participation we estimate the 
parameters of the following equation separately for each age group: 
 
  01 2 3 4 5 it it it it it it i t it LFP k Educ LE Urban SocSec β ββ β β β δ δ =+ + + + + + + + ε  (1) 
 
 
where LFPit is the age-group specific male labor force participation rate in country i in period t, k 
is log capital per working-age person, and Educ is the average years of schooling of men in the 
age group of interest. LE stands for male life expectancy, while Urban measures the degree of 
urbanization. It should be noted that that the capital stock, life expectancy and the urban 
population share in country i at time t are common to all age groups, while the years of schooling 
variable is age-group specific. SocSec are the social security variables discussed in the previous 
section. δi and δt are country and year dummies, respectively, and  it ε is an error term.   
We use capital per working-age person and years of schooling as proxies for the wage 
rate. To address endogeneity concerns we normalize the capital stock to the population of 
working age rather than the actual number of workers. We expect wages to rise with the capital- 
to-working-age ratio and years of schooling. We also expect wages to rise over time with 
technological progress, captured by our time dummies. However, the wage rate has both income 
and substitution effects. A high wage rate encourages additional labor supply and later 
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demand for leisure and earlier retirement (Costa, 1995). This makes the effect of theses variables 
on retirement ambiguous, though we might expect them to have similar signs. 
We also include male life expectancy as an explanatory variable. Prospective lifespan can 
affect life cycle behavior such as retirement and savings (Bloom, Canning, Mansfield and 
Moore, 2007, Hurd et al., 2004). In theory, in an optimizing model, an increase in lifespan will 
generally lead to later retirement, though it can result in earlier retirement if the longer expected 
lifespan is associated with a lower degree of uncertainty regarding the actual length of life 
(Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil, 2002).  
We regard a social system as having universal coverage if workers in all sectors are 
covered by the system. However, workers in agriculture are sometimes subject to special rules 
and are not always covered by the social security system in the same way as non-agricultural 
workers. We include the level of urbanization in the country as a proxy for the importance of the 
agricultural sector.     
Our age groups cover five-year intervals, with the exception of the 65+ age group, which 
is open-ended by construction. Participation in the labor market for this group depends on the 
age distribution within the group, with higher participation rates expected if the fraction of 
relatively young men is high. Therefore, we include the proportion of those under age 70 in the 
age group of 65+ as an explanatory variable, though for this age group alone.  
Finally, we estimate the effect of our five social security variables: the social security 
eligibility age, the number of years prior to this early retirement is allowed, the deferred 
retirement pension benefit, and the replacement rates in defined contribution and defined benefit 
systems, respectively. We estimate the effect of the pension system on each age group 
separately. It is useful to combine the effect in the age specific participation rates into a single 
measure. We do this by calculating the expected retirement age given age specific participation 
rates and then finding the effect of s social security change on the expected retirement age.      
We now model the expected retirement age. At each age t we take the participation rate 
to be , while the probability that a man who is working retires at age t (the retirement hazard 
rate) is  . We assume men start working at age 15, work up to a retirement age R, and live up 
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Men retire exactly at age t if they participate up to t and then retire at t, and we integrate over 
these retirement ages to get expected retirement age. The second equality can be derived by 
integration by parts and the fact that  /,( 1 5 )1 rp p p = −= && .  
  If we assume full participation up to age 50, and that retirement occurs before age T 
10, 
so , it follows that we can approximate the expected retirement age by  (50) 1, ( ) 0 pp T ==
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where  rs p −  is the average participation rate of men aged r-s, and  65 p + is the average participation 
rate of those 65 and older.  In equation (3) we take the participation rate in each age interval to 
be the average participation rate of men in the age group.  
  The only remaining issue is to approximate T, the terminal age. We approximate the 
average value of T by assuming that there are negligible deaths before age 65 and a stable 
survival schedule and thereafter and no population growth. Let   be the death rate at time t 
and let  be the proportion of those that survive to t. Then  
() dt
() st
65 65 65 60 64
65 65
( ) 6 5 ()() 6 5 () 6 5 / 6 5 5 ( / ) ET t dtstd t std t N N N N
∞∞
++ =+ =+ =+ ≈+ ∫∫ − =75.9 (4) 
In a stable and stationary population the ratio of those over 65,  65 N + to those aged 65,   is 
equal to life expectancy at 65.  We can approximate the number of people age 65 as one fifth of 
those aged 60-64 given negligible deaths in the pre-65 age group.  The ratio of the male 
population over 65 to the male population 60-64 in our sample is 2.17. This means that a man 
who reaches 65 in our sample lives on average an additional 10.9 years.
65 N
11 This gives us as 
estimate of T = 75.9, which is about 6 years higher than the average life expectancy at birth in 
our sample. When we find an effect of changes in social security on average participation rates 
                                                 
10 Assuming that participation rates are steady for those over 65 so that  () p T =  65 p + changes our result very little. 
The final term in equation (3) becomes  65 ( 1 65) Tp + + − instead of  65 (6 5 ) Tp + − . However, it seems more 
plausible that participation rates fall with age over 65 and approach zero at T.  
11 The population over 65 is the integral of the survival curve over 65, however this is also the average life span after 
65.   
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expected retirement age. In the results presented below we estimate the effect of changes in 
social security on age-specific male labor force participation and also the effect of changes in 
social security on this constructed expected age of retirement.  
In our analysis we assume that changes to social security system are exogenous and are 
set independently of labor supply. As pointed out by Gruber and Wise (1998), this assumption 
may be problematic if governments change social security schemes in response to labor market 
conditions. However, individual country studies (e.g. Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998) have 
shown that changes in policy generally precede changes in labor supply. While social security 
reforms do respond to retirement behavior, in most cases reforms are implemented very slowly. 
Reforms generally do not apply to those who are about to retire, but are phased in gradually to 
apply to those that will retire in the future. Thus the system under which the current elderly are 
operating is likely not affected by their own retirement decisions. To the extent that there is an 
endogenous policy response (e.g., raising the social security eligibility age to counteract 
increasing early retirement) we will underestimate the true effect of social security reforms, so 
that our estimates could be interpreted as a lower bound for the true policy impact. 
 
Results 
  In Table 5 we report simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the determinants of 
male participation rates.  The log capital stock per worker is associated with significantly lower 
male labor market participation for men over 55, while years of education are associated with 
lower participation for men over 60. The time dummies are negative with large decreases in 
participation in later years for men under 65.  These results are consistent with the idea that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effects so that higher wages, due to increased capital 
stock, education and technical progress, lead to earlier retirement and lower labor supply. A 
higher level of urbanization is associated with lower labor force participation, which may be due 
to lower pension coverage, or benefits, to agricultural workers. We also find a negative effect of 
life expectancy on participation for those over 65. This seems to suggest that the human capital 
and income effects of improved health are larger than the effect of a longer lifespan.  
  We find higher social security eligibility ages, as well as fewer allowed years of early 
retirement, to be associated with a higher labor force participation rate for men between the ages 
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over 55. Higher replacement rates are associated with lower labor market participation for men 
between 55 and 59 years of age. The last column of table 5 shows the effect of our variables on 
the average retirement age calculated using equation (3).  
  The results in table 5 use differences in social security arrangements to explain 
differences in labor force participation across countries. Yet social security arrangements may be 
correlated with unobserved national characteristics that affect retirement. For example, national 
policies on social security may be rooted in deep-seated social preferences on labor supply that 
are also reflected in retirement behavior, and thus the observed relationship between social 
security rules and retirement behavior across countries, as seen in Table 5, may not be causal. 
From a policy perspective, it is important to track what happens over time within a country as it 
changes its social security arrangements. For this reason Besley and Case (2000) recommend the 
use of fixed effects when examining the effect of policy changes on behavior in panel data.   
  In Table 6 we report the results of our regressions adding country fixed effects. The 
included country fixed effects control for unobserved variables that are country-specific but do 
not vary within a given country over the sample period. While social security arrangements are 
likely to reflect social attitudes and preferences in the long run, policy reforms tend to occur in 
discrete episodic jumps. If we can regard the timing of these policy jumps as random or 
reflective of unrelated political circumstances, we have exogenous variation in social security 
that we can use to identify the effect of policy changes. 
  In table 6 increases in the log capital stock per working-age person, and the time 
dummies, are associated with large reductions in male labor supply. This supports the idea of a 
large income effect on the demand for leisure. We estimate that the average retirement age in our 
sample of countries has fallen by 2.3 years between 1970 and 2000 simply through the time 
trend.   
  However, in the fixed effects model, the number of years of education is not significant. 
Extending the length of education may raise annual income, but it also delays entry to the 
workforce. As a result, it may not significantly raise lifetime income unless retirement is 
postponed. In the fixed effects model, the effect of the urban share of the population on 
participation becomes positive for some age groups; whereas countries with high levels of 
urbanization have lower participation, those that increase their urbanization rate see higher levels 
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high wages for older workers, relative to their lifetime average wage rate. This may spur high 
participation rates.  
  Our main focus, however, is on the effect of social security arrangements. The social 
security eligibility age has a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) effect on the 
participation of men over 60. Column 5 of Table 6, which is based on the formula derived in 
equation (3), shows that raising the eligibility age by one year increases average retirement age 
by about 0.16 years. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Allowing early retirement 
significantly lowers the participation of men aged 60 and above. We estimate that an additional 
allowed year of early retirement reduces the average retirement age by about 0.11 years.  
  We estimate that the bonus for deferring retirement has a positive effect on participation 
for each group, with larger effects for those over 60. Although none of the individual age specific 
participation rate regressions give coefficients on the bonus that is statistically significant, the 
estimated effect on the average retirement age is positive and significant at the 5% level. We 
estimate that augmenting pensions by 1% of wage income for each additional year worked 
increases the average retirement age by 0.07 years.  
  On one hand, raising the replacement rate in defined benefit schemes tends to reduce 
participation rates, particularly in the 55-59 age group. We estimate that each additional 10% of 
income that is replaced lowers the average retirement age by 0.1 years. On the other hand, 
increasing the replacement rate in the defined contribution scheme appears to raise participation 
rates for men under 65. We estimate that each additional 10% of income replaced in a defined 
contribution scheme (which requires higher contribution rates) increases the average retirement 
age by about 0.2 years.   
    All five of our social security variables have statistically significant effects on the 
average retirement age, as shown in Table 6. The incentive effects of changing the social security 
eligibility age, allowed years of early retirement, and the pension bonus for working past the 
normal retirement age are clear. It is less obvious why switching from a defined benefit to a 
defined contribution scheme should have such a large effect on retirement behavior. Defined 
contribution schemes provide a clear incentive to keep working, as later retirement allows for the 
accumulation of a larger capital fund and gives a higher pension when retired. However, we 
account for this in our deferred pension bonus where we assume that additional years of work 
  15allow both larger contributions and interest on capital to be earned before distributions from 
pension capital begin.  
  One possible explanation for our finding is that defined benefit schemes offer additional 
incentives to stop working, relative to defined contribution systems, that our model does not take 
into account, such as distributional effects and differences in risk (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). 
Most defined benefit schemes have a redistribution goal, in addition to providing a method of 
saving. The incentives for those at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution may be 
different from those for the representative worker we use in the construction of our measures. 
For example, minimum and maximum pension payouts may generate large incentives for 
workers at either end of the earnings distribution to retire early by making their pension 
insensitive to their choices, even if workers in the middle of the distribution are rewarded for 
retiring later. Our data lacks sufficient detail on the social security systems to allow construction 
of measures that take account of these subtler but potentially significant incentive effects at 
different points in the income distribution.    
  An alternative explanation is that even if the incentives implicit in a defined benefit and a 
defined contribution system are the same, workers may think of the two systems differently. 
Framing effects are important in decision making, and framing a decision as retiring to get access 
to public funds, as opposed to retiring and drawing down ones “own” funds, may elicit different 
labor supply decisions, even if the two decisions have the same effect on current and future 
income.  
We undertake a number of robustness checks to assess the generality of our results. The 
results in Table 6 cover all 40 countries in our sample. Many of the cases of social security 
reform in our sample involve middle-income countries, there is a concern that our results may 
not apply to high income countries. In addition, some of the middle income countries in our 
sample underwent very rapid economic growth over the period 1970-2000, which may have 
affected their labor markets dramatically. In particular, the two countries with the most reliance 
on defined contribution systems, Singapore and Malaysia, may not be representative of richer 
countries in the Western world. Moreover, the social security systems in some of the middle-
income countries in our sample, while theoretically universal in their coverage, may in practice 
only apply to formal sector workers. There may be unregulated, informal sectors in some of our 
sample countries that are not covered by the social security system, but which do affect measured 
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countries that were members of the OECD in 1975 as noted in Table 1. The sample restriction 
appears to have little effect; the results in Table 7 are very similar to those found in Table 6, with 
slightly larger estimated retirements effects associated with moving from a defined benefit to a 
defined contribution system.  
A second issue arises when estimating the effect of social security reform (changing from 
defined benefit to defined contribution) when countries use only a defined benefit system. In 
Table 6 we pool countries from defined benefit and defined contribution systems. However, the 
effect of changes in eligibility and early retirement ages, and the deferred retirement bonus, may 
differ across the two systems. In Table 8 we therefore report estimates for the 32 countries that 
had only defined benefit systems throughout the period. We find that the estimated effects of 
social security reform within a defined benefit system are very similar to those estimated for the 
whole sample in Table 6. We do not report separate results for defined contribution systems; 
only eight countries had such systems, and in many cases these make up a small portion of the 
overall pension scheme.      
  To get a better picture of the magnitude of the effects we estimate, it is useful to consider 
an individual country. In 1990, Italy had a social security eligibility age of 60, allowed up to 10 
years of early retirement and had a replacement rate of 80% in a defined benefit system, with no 
bonus for delaying retirement. By 2000, Italy had raised its normal retirement age to 65. Using 
the results reported in Table 6, we estimate that this five year increase in the eligibility age 
increased its average retirement age by 0.78 years. However, if in addition to raising the normal 
retirement age, Italy had reduced allowing early retirement by five years we estimate an increase 
in the average retirement age of 1.06 years. An increase in the deferred pension benefit to 5% a 
year would cause average retirement age among Italian men to rise by 0.36 years according to 
our estimates. Taken together, these estimates imply that a comprehensive reform of a defined 
benefit system could raise the average retirement age in Italy by about 2.3 years. In addition, a 
switch from a defined benefit system to a defined contribution system with the same 80% 
replacement rate would increase men’s average retirement age by a further 2.8 years according to 
our estimates. These reforms therefore appear to have the potential to raise the average 
retirement age by up to 5.1 years in total. We report these estimates of the effect of a 
hypothetical package of reforms in Table 9. 
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4. Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of the institutional features of national social security 
systems on male labor force participation and the average retirement age. Our empirical results 
yield two main findings. First, income effects seem to dominate the substitution effect in old-age 
labor force participation decisions, in that higher wages (due to higher capital stocks and 
technical progress) and incomes lead to earlier retirement ─ a finding consistent with previous 
US-focused studies by Krueger and Pischke (1992) and Costa (1995) .  
The main focus of this paper, however, lies in our second finding, which highlights the 
importance of social security arrangements. We find that increasing the social security eligibility 
age, reducing allowed years of early retirement, and increasing pensions for workers who work 
past the normal retirement age significantly increase male labor supply and the average 
retirement age. We also find large increases in the retirement age when countries shift from 
defined benefit to defined contribution systems with similar replacement rates. We hypothesize 
that this reflects either “hidden” retirement incentives inherent to defined benefit systems but not 
captured in our coding, or framing effects. 
Our work has two weaknesses when compared with national-level studies. One is our use 
of measures of national social security systems as derived from countries’ reports to the US 
Social Security Administration. These reports give crude indicators of systems that are generally 
very complex. More detailed national studies allow for this complexity, particularly looking at 
how incentives vary for men with different income levels (Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008) as well as 
the treatment of women and married couples, the tax treatment of pensions,  the availability of 
disability benefits (Duggan et al., 2007), and the construction of age specific incentive effects 
(Coile and Gruber, 2001). A second issue is our use of aggregate data on participation rates by 
age group. More detailed studies use microeconomic labor force data, which show how 
retirement varies by education level, earnings, and martial status. Microeconomic data also 
allows the estimation of a structural model based on individual decision making (French, 2005, 
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005).  
Despite these limitations, we our approach does allow us to see the effects of large social 
security reforms on overall participation, and provides estimates of the magnitude of these 
effects.  Within individual countries there are often only a very limited range of reforms, and the 
  18timing of a particular reform may make it difficult to separate its effects from other changes to 
the national economy. By pooling cross-country and time series data for many countries, we do 
lose some detail, but we gain in the range and number of reforms experienced, and our ability to 
identify their effects.  
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  21Table 1: Country List 
 
           
1 Argentina  21  Luxembourg
a)
2 Australia
d) 22 Malaysia 
3 Austria
a) 23 Malta 
4 Belgium
a) 24 Mauritius 




7 Chile  27  New  Zealand
e)
8 Costa  Rica  28  Norway
a)





c) 31 Saudi  Arabia 
12 France
a) 32 Singapore 




15 Greece  35 Sweden
a)






a) 38 United  Kingdom
a)
19 Japan
b) 39 United  States
a)
20 Korea,  Rep.  40 Uruguay 
Notes: a) Original OECD member    
      b), c), d), e): Joined the OECD in 1964, 1969, 1971 and 1973, respectively
 





Male labor force participation, age 50-54  90.0 4.2  69.0 97.5
Male labor force participation, age 55-59  79.3 9.3  50.2 95.2
Male labor force participation, age 60-64  56.2 17.7  14.1 87.0
Male labor force participation, age 65+  23.4 16.0  1.9 71.5
Log(capital per working age person)  3.7 0.8  1.5 5.0
Male life expectancy  69.3 5.9  45.5 78.0
Urban population share  70.6 15.7  32.0 100.0
Average years of education, males 50-54  7.6 3.2  0.9 14.1
Average years of education, males 55-59  7.0 3.3  0.6 13.4
Average years of education, males 60-64  6.5 3.4  0.4 13.1
Average years of education, males 65+  5.6 3.4  0.2 12.9
Share of population 65-69 over population 65+  38.4 4.6  26.3 53.7
Social security eligibility age  63.0 3.8  50.0 70.0
Allowed years of early retirement  2.3 3.9  0.0 20.0
Replacement rate: defined benefits  59.6 26.5  0.0 114.0
Replacement rate: defined contributions  3.0 14.2  0.0 118.9
Deferred retirement bonus (% increase in pension per year)  1.1 1.9 0.0 11.7
Based on 264 observations in 40 countries from 1970 to 2000.  
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Argentina 1970  60  0  4.1  82.0  0.0 
Argentina 1980  60  0  1.7  70.0  0.0 
Argentina 1990  60  0  1.7  70.0  0.0 
Argentina 2000  64  0  2.3  89.3  2.5 
Australia 1970  65  0  0.0  40.9  0.0 
Australia 1980  65  0  0.0  50.4  0.0 
Australia 1990  65  0  0.0  47.3  0.0 
Australia 2000  65  0  0.4  47.8  2.9 
Austria 1970  65  5  0.0  76.5  0.0 
Austria 1980  65  5  2.3  76.5  0.0 
Austria 1990  65  5  0.0  79.5  0.0 
Austria 2000  65  5  3.2  80.0  0.0 
Belgium 1970  65  5  0.0  60.0  0.0 
Belgium 1980  65  5  0.0  64.4  0.0 
Belgium 1990  65  5  0.0  63.7  0.0 
Belgium 2000  65  5  0.0  62.6  0.0 
Brazil 1970  65  20  0.0  75.0  0.0 
Brazil 1980  65  20  0.0  95.0  0.0 
Brazil 1990  65  15  0.0  95.0  0.0 
Brazil 2000  65  12  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Canada 1970  65  0  0.0  41.8  0.0 
Canada 1980  65  0  0.0  50.6  0.0 
Canada 1990  65  5  3.0  50.8  0.0 
Canada 2000  65  5  2.8  47.2  0.0 
Chile 1970  65  0  2.3  70.0  0.0 
Chile 1980  65  0  2.3  70.0  0.0 
Chile 1990  65  0  2.8  64.0  4.2 
Chile 2000  65  0  2.3  41.1  12.0 
Costa Rica  1970  65  5  5.6  70.0  0.0 
Costa Rica  1980  65  8  5.6  94.0  0.0 
Costa Rica  1990  65  4  1.7  113.5  0.0 
Costa Rica  2000  65  3  1.6  86.9  1.2 
Cyprus 1980  65  0  0.0  33.0  0.0 















Cyprus 1990  65  0  0.0  46.8  0.0 
Cyprus 2000  65  2  0.0  37.0  0.0 
Denmark 1970  67  0  2.0  62.0  0.0 
Denmark 1980  67  0  6.8  68.4  0.0 
Denmark 1990  67  0  0.0  53.7  0.0 
Denmark 2000  67  0  0.1  58.6  0.1 
Finland 1970  65  0  1.5  32.4  0.0 
Finland 1980  65  0  4.0  60.0  0.0 
Finland 1990  65  5  1.6  60.0  0.0 
Finland 2000  65  5  4.3  60.0  0.0 
France 1970  60  0  0.8  20.0  0.0 
France 1980  60  0  1.3  25.0  0.0 
France 1990  60  0  0.0  50.0  0.0 
France 2000  60  0  0.0  50.0  0.0 
Gabon 1970  55  0  0.0  35.0  0.0 
Gabon 1980  55  0  0.0  40.0  0.0 
Gabon 1990  55  0  0.0  47.0  0.0 
Gabon 2000  55  0  0.0  57.0  0.0 
Germany 2000  65  2  4.7  78.2  0.0 
Greece 1970  62  2  0.0  114.0  0.0 
Greece 1980  62  2  0.0  99.1  0.0 
Greece 1990  65  5  0.0  91.3  0.0 
Greece 2000  65  7  0.0  85.5  0.0 
Hong Kong  1980  70  0  0.0  10.2  0.0 
Hong Kong  1990  70  5  0.0  5.9  0.0 
Hong Kong  2000  70  5  0.0  6.7  0.0 
Ireland 1970  70  0  0.0  47.0  0.0 
Ireland 1980  66  1  0.0  64.2  0.0 
Ireland 1990  66  1  0.0  66.5  0.0 
Ireland 2000  66  1  0.0  33.0  0.0 
Italy 1970  60  10  0.0  74.0  0.0 
Italy 1980  60  10  0.0  80.0  0.0 
Italy 1990  60  10  0.0  80.0  0.0 
Italy 2000  65  10  0.0  80.0  0.0 















Japan 1970  60  0  0.0  86.8  0.0 
Japan 1980  60  0  0.0  94.9  0.0 
Japan 1990  65  5  8.0  66.6  0.0 
Japan 2000  65  5  8.1  67.2  0.0 
Korea, Republic  1990  60  0  0.0  33.3  0.0 
Korea, Republic  2000  60  5  0.0  37.5  0.0 
Luxembourg 1970  65  3 0.0 83.3  0.0 
Luxembourg 1980  65  5 0.0 83.3  0.0 
Luxembourg 1990  65  5 0.0  101.6 0.0 
Luxembourg 2000  65  8 0.0 97.6  0.0 
Malaysia 1970  55  0  1.0  0.0  13.8 
Malaysia 1980  55  0  1.3  0.0  25.9 
Malaysia 1990  55  0  2.2  0.0  50.9 
Malaysia 2000  55  0  2.8  0.0  64.1 
Malta 1970  63  0  0.0  50.3  0.0 
Malta 1980  61  0  0.0  66.7  0.0 
Malta 1990  61  0  0.0  66.7  0.0 
Malta 2000  61  0  0.0  66.7  0.0 
Mauritius 1980  60  0  0.0  26.3  0.0 
Mauritius 1990  60  0  0.0  39.2  0.0 
Mauritius 2000  60  0  0.0  58.0  0.0 
Mexico 1970  65  0  2.0  59.0  0.0 
Mexico 1980  65  0  0.0  86.4  0.0 
Mexico 1990  65  0  0.0  90.8  0.0 
Mexico 2000  65  5  0.0  93.5  0.0 
Netherlands 1970  65  0  0.0  60.2 0.0 
Netherlands 1980  65  0  0.0  86.9 0.0 
Netherlands 1990  65  0  0.0  72.1 0.0 
Netherlands 2000  65  0  0.0  51.5 0.0 
New Zealand  1970  65  0  0.0  47.7  0.0 
New Zealand  1980  60  0  0.0  86.7  0.0 
New Zealand  1990  60  0  0.0  98.2  0.0 
New Zealand  2000  64  0  0.0  66.3  0.0 
Norway 1970  70  0  0.0  40.5  0.0 















Norway 1980  67  0  4.9  54.2  0.0 
Norway 1990  67  0  0.0  58.2  0.0 
Norway 2000  67  0  0.0  44.4  0.0 
Panama 1970  60  0  5.0  69.0  0.0 
Panama 1980  60  5  2.0  100.0  0.0 
Panama 1990  60  5  2.0  100.0  0.0 
Panama 2000  62  0  2.0  100.0  0.0 
Portugal 1970  65  0  0.0  70.0  0.0 
Portugal 1980  65  0  0.0  70.0  0.0 
Portugal 1990  65  0  0.0  80.0  0.0 
Saudi Arabia  1970  60  0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Saudi Arabia  1980  60  0  0.0  22.0  0.0 
Saudi Arabia  1990  60  0  0.0  42.0  0.0 
Saudi Arabia  2000  60  0  0.0  62.0  0.0 
Singapore 1970  55  0  0.9  0.0  11.1 
Singapore 1980  55  0  2.1  0.0  38.1 
Singapore 1990  55  0  4.2  0.0  91.7 
Singapore 2000  55  0  5.1  0.0  118.9 
South Africa  1970  65  0  0.0  16.8  0.0 
South Africa  1980  65  0  0.0  25.7  0.0 
South Africa  1990  65  0  0.0  48.3  0.0 
South Africa  2000  65  0  0.0  37.0  0.0 
Spain 1970  65  0  0.0  50.0  0.0 
Spain 1980  65  0  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Spain 1990  65  0  0.0  85.7  0.0 
Spain 2000  65  5  0.0  85.7  0.0 
Sweden 1970  67  4  3.5  48.4  0.0 
Sweden 1980  65  5  4.5  62.6  0.0 
Sweden 1990  65  5  5.6  67.2  0.0 
Sweden 2000  65  5  4.2  49.4  0.0 
Switzerland 1970  65  0  0.0  27.7 0.0 
Switzerland 1980  65  0  0.0  47.3 0.0 
Switzerland 1990  65  0  1.0  45.8 4.4 
Switzerland 2000  65  0  1.0  58.8  11.5 















Turkey 1970  55  0  0.7  68.0  0.0 
Turkey 1980  55  12  0.6  60.0  0.0 
Turkey 1990  55  9  0.8  80.0  0.0 
Turkey 2000  55  9  0.0  70.0  0.0 
United Kingdom  1970  65  0  2.2  38.2  0.0 
United Kingdom  1980  65  0  4.4  58.8  0.0 
United Kingdom  1990  65  0  3.5  47.0  0.0 
United Kingdom  2000  65  0  3.1  41.3  0.0 
United States  1970  65  3  0.0  49.0  0.0 
United States  1980  65  3  0.5  45.9  0.0 
United States  1990  65  3  1.9  47.1  0.0 
United States  2000  65  3  3.0  46.0  0.0 
Uruguay 1970  50  0  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Uruguay 1980  60  0  0.0  70.0  0.0 
Uruguay 1990  60  0  0.0  75.0  0.0 
Uruguay 2000  60  0  3.0  55.0  0.0 
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1970 62.8  1.7  52.8  0.9  0.7  2 
1975 62.6  2.1  59.3  1.5  1.1  2 
1980 62.6  2.4  63.5  1.3  1.7  2 
1985 62.7  2.5  63.9  1.1  2.8  3 
1990 62.8  2.6  65.4  1.2  3.9  4 
1995 63.0  2.7  62.7  1.2  4.8  6 
2000 63.3  2.7  60.9  1.4  5.5  8 
Notes:  Based on 34 countries with complete data from 1970-2000.     
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Table 5: Determinants of Male Labor Force Participation  
Method of Estimation: OLS 
 
Dependent variable  Male labor force participation 
Age group  50-54  55-59  60-64  65+ 
Retirement Age 
         
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
         
Log(capital stock per working age)  -0.816  -4.150*** -8.685*** -6.409***  -1.381*** 
  (0.532)  (1.109) (1.876) (1.395)  (0.189) 
Life expectancy (males)  0.057  0.023  -0.011  -0.624**  -0.065* 
  (0.075)  (0.120) (0.244) (0.281)  (0.034) 
Urban population share  -0.055***  -0.077**  -0.158**  -0.217***  -0.038*** 
  (0.018)  (0.038) (0.068) (0.050)  (0.007) 
Male years of education  0.106  0.097  -0.636*  -0.744**  -0.103** 
  (0.150)  (0.234) (0.378) (0.314)  (0.041) 
Social security eligibility age  0.193**  0.459***  1.018***  -0.125  0.070* 
  (0.092)  (0.139) (0.255) (0.298)  (0.036) 
Allowed early retirement years  -0.248***  -0.715***  -0.557**  -0.280  -0.106*** 
  (0.067)  (0.129) (0.232) (0.205)  (0.026) 
Deferred retirement bonus  0.216  0.787**  1.437***  1.081**  0.240*** 
  (0.145)  (0.331) (0.539) (0.463)  (0.060) 
Replacement rate: defined benefit  -0.018 -0.049**  -0.054  -0.026  -0.009* 
  (0.011)  (0.023) (0.041) (0.036)  (0.005) 
Replacement rate: defined contribution  0.031* -0.074*  0.063 0.106 0.013 
  (0.017)  (0.043) (0.059) (0.069)  (0.008) 
Share (ages 65-69/population 65+)        -0.142   
       (0.253)   
Year  1975  -0.608  -0.879 -2.153 -1.772  -0.375 
  (0.933)  (1.710) (3.299) (2.738)  (0.354) 
Year  1980  -0.991  -1.488 -4.488 -3.080  -0.684* 
  (0.922)  (1.700) (3.327) (2.789)  (0.359) 
Year  1985  -1.440 -2.822 -6.389* -4.169  -0.987** 
  (0.888)  (1.743) (3.385) (3.011)  (0.381) 
Year  1990  -1.802* -3.752** -7.997**  -2.952  -0.999*** 
  (0.945)  (1.810) (3.482) (3.006)  (0.384) 
Year 1995  -2.320**  -4.619**  -8.816**  -1.188  -0.917** 
  (0.971)  (1.840) (3.623) (3.143)  (0.401) 
Year 2000  -2.773***  -3.992**  -8.351**  -0.433  -0.803* 
  (1.050)  (1.836) (3.696) (3.549)  (0.441) 
         
R-squared  0.206  0.331 0.347 0.539   
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are based on 264 observations in 40 high- and middle-income countries over 
the period 1970-2000. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
  30Table 6: Determinants of Male Labor Force Participation  
Method of Estimation: Fixed Effects 
 
 
Dependent variable  Male labor force participation 
Age group  50-54  55-59  60-64  65+ 
Effect on 
retirement age  
          
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
          
Log(capital stock per working age)  -3.764*** -7.488*** -13.905***  -5.417**  -1.848*** 
  (1.114)  (1.565) (2.628) (2.496)  (0.317) 
Life expectancy (males)  0.175  0.196  0.347  -0.080  0.027 
  (0.125)  (0.199) (0.384) (0.184)  (0.030) 
Urban population share  0.091  0.250***  0.385***  0.021  0.039*** 
  (0.062)  (0.083) (0.122) (0.105)  (0.014) 
Male years of education  -0.242  -0.342  0.228  0.860  0.076 
  (0.228)  (0.427) (0.741) (0.766)  (0.094) 
Social security eligibility age  0.231*  0.277  1.204***  0.658**  0.157*** 
  (0.119)  (0.271) (0.303) (0.310)  (0.040) 
Allowed early retirement years  0.112  -0.114  -0.550**  -0.721**  -0.106*** 
  (0.242)  (0.265) (0.227) (0.279)  (0.037) 
Deferred retirement bonus  0.077  0.177  0.333  0.392  0.072** 
  (0.107)  (0.190) (0.237) (0.241)  (0.031) 
Replacement rate defined benefit  -0.006 -0.075***  -0.041  -0.047 -0.011*** 
  (0.018)  (0.029) (0.043) (0.029)  (0.004) 
Replacement rate defined 
contribution 
0.081*** 0.106***  0.142***  0.065  0.024*** 
  (0.019)  (0.028) (0.037) (0.049)  (0.006) 
Share (ages 65-69/population 65+)        0.330***   
       (0.114)   
Year 1975  -0.648  -1.093  -3.024*  -2.627**  -0.524*** 
  (0.615)  (0.991) (1.692) (1.303)  (0.175) 
Year 1980  -1.499**  -2.750**  -6.931***  -5.040***  -1.108*** 
  (0.748)  (1.164) (2.014) (1.408)  (0.196) 
Year  1985  -2.183**  -4.880*** -10.889*** -6.840***  -1.643*** 
  (0.911)  (1.350) (2.358) (1.703)  (0.234) 
Year  1990  -2.731**  -6.542*** -14.617*** -8.701***  -2.142*** 
  (1.148)  (1.677) (2.848) (2.052)  (0.284) 
Year  1995  -3.206**  -7.760*** -16.345*** -8.394***  -2.280*** 
  (1.399)  (1.965) (3.355) (2.565)  (0.347) 
Year  2000  -3.602**  -7.303*** -16.848*** -8.487***  -2.312*** 
  (1.434)  (2.145) (4.176) (3.038)  (0.412) 
          
R-squared 0.801  0.889  0.929  0.943   
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are based on 264 observations in 40 high- and middle-income countries 
over the period 1970-2000. 
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Table 7: Determinants of Male Labor Force Participation in OECD Countries 
Method of Estimation: Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent variable  Male labor force participation 
Age  group  50-54 55-59 60-64  65+ 
Effect on 
retirement age 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
        
Log(capital stock per working age)  -0.959  -0.193  -10.527  -3.651  -0.982 
  (2.574) (4.758) (6.471) (3.893)  (0.597) 
Life expectancy (males)  -1.195***  -2.528***  -0.526  0.082  -0.203*** 
  (0.379) (0.377) (0.702) (0.457)  (0.066) 
Urban population share  -0.126  0.122  0.099  -0.686***  -0.070*** 
  (0.112) (0.125) (0.223) (0.171)  (0.023) 
Male years of education  -0.667***  -0.664  -0.710  1.583**  0.070 
  (0.245) (0.443) (0.913) (0.751)  (0.097) 
Social security eligibility age  0.478*  0.086  0.738*  0.430*  0.112** 
  (0.243) (0.491) (0.445) (0.257)  (0.045) 
Allowed early retirement years  0.282  0.162  -0.504*  -0.812***  -0.091*** 
  (0.248) (0.227) (0.267) (0.232)  (0.033) 
Deferred retirement bonus  0.236  0.435*  0.529  0.644***  0.130*** 
  (0.173) (0.229) (0.329) (0.243)  (0.034) 
Replacement rate defined benefit  0.037*  -0.054 -0.162***  -0.062** -0.016*** 
  (0.022) (0.035) (0.051) (0.028)  (0.004) 
Replacement rate defined 
contribution 
0.191 0.249 -0.070  0.950***  0.122*** 
  (0.141) (0.196) (0.364) (0.303)  (0.040) 
Share (ages 65-69/population 65+)        0.144   
      (0.112)   
Year 1975  0.589  0.526  -1.848  -2.483*  -0.307 
  (0.852) (0.976) (1.942) (1.342)  (0.187) 
Year 1980  1.171  1.158  -4.679*  -6.235***  -0.797*** 
  (1.330) (1.503) (2.597) (1.572)  (0.237) 
Year 1985  1.965  1.244  -8.292***  -8.059***  -1.132*** 
  (1.824) (1.733) (3.100) (2.039)  (0.298) 
Year 1990  2.624  1.444  -10.161***  -9.102***  -1.296*** 
  (2.427) (2.318) (3.814) (2.514)  (0.373) 
Year 1995  3.976  2.236  -11.224**  -9.719***  -1.309*** 
  (3.047) (2.890) (4.512) (3.224)  (0.467) 
Year 2000  5.482  6.603*  -9.093  -9.863**  -0.925 
  (3.656) (3.575) (5.596) (4.044)  (0.580) 
        
R-squared  0.848 0.939 0.955 0.949   
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are based on 155 observations in 23 OECD countries over the period 1970-
2000. Countries are included in the sample if they were OECD members by 1975. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
  32Table 8: Determinants of Male Labor Force Participation in Countries with Defined 
Benefit Systems Only 
Method of Estimation: Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent variable  Male labor force participation 
Age group  50-54  55-59  60-64  65+ 
Effect on 
retirement age 
          
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
Log(capital stock per working age)  -4.174***  -5.716**  -15.676***  -12.439***  -2.633*** 
 (1.528)  (2.195)  (3.376)  (2.171)  (0.320) 
Life expectancy (males)  0.036  0.025  0.347  0.393*  0.063* 
 (0.103)  (0.213)  (0.454)  (0.221)  (0.035) 
Urban population share  0.050  0.282**  0.334**  -0.239**  0.007 
 (0.085)  (0.116)  (0.153)  (0.099)  (0.015) 
Male years of education  -0.226  0.214  0.189  1.786**  0.203* 
 (0.296)  (0.531)  (0.854)  (0.829)  (0.104) 
Social security eligibility age  0.365***  0.362  1.078***  0.478*  0.142*** 
 (0.134)  (0.300)  (0.264)  (0.277)  (0.037) 
Allowed early retirement years  0.115  -0.169  -0.571**  -0.794***  -0.118*** 
 (0.236)  (0.265)  (0.224)  (0.240)  (0.033) 
Deferred retirement bonus  0.133  0.276  0.694***  0.388  0.097*** 
 (0.160)  (0.252)  (0.218)  (0.291)  (0.037) 
Replacement rate defined benefit  0.026  -0.041 -0.017  -0.070** -0.009** 
 (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.048)  (0.029)  (0.004) 
Replacement rate defined contribution           
          
Share (ages 65-69/population 65+)        0.240**  0.026** 
       (0.103)  (0.011) 
Year 1975  -0.448  -1.780  -2.712  -1.271  -0.386** 
 (0.719)  (1.144)  (1.905)  (1.253)  (0.179) 
Year 1980  -1.091  -3.781***  -6.208***  -3.229**  -0.906*** 
 (0.903)  (1.359)  (2.228)  (1.340)  (0.201) 
Year 1985  -1.490  -6.235***  -10.075***  -5.704***  -1.511*** 
 (1.119)  (1.603)  (2.585)  (1.693)  (0.245) 
Year 1990  -2.107  -8.435***  -14.347***  -7.944***  -2.110*** 
 (1.398)  (1.970)  (3.197)  (2.046)  (0.299) 
Year 1995  -2.246  -10.244***  -15.866***  -6.963***  -2.176*** 
 (1.719)  (2.338)  (3.789)  (2.593)  (0.369) 
Year 2000  -2.422  -10.210***  -15.732***  -7.053**  -2.186*** 
 (1.792)  (2.651)  (4.815)  (3.070)  (0.442) 
          
R-squared 0.809  0.900  0.938  0.957   
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are based on 208 observations in 32 high- and middle-income countries with 
no defined contribution systems over the period 1970-2000. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
  33Table 9: Interpreting the Results: The Effect of a Reform Package 
 
Reform  Effect on expected 
retirement age (years) 
Increase Social Security Eligibility age by 5 years   0.8 
Reduce allowed early retirement by 5 years  1.1 
Increase deferral benefit by 3% a year  0.4 
Switch from 80% defined benefit to 80% defined 
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Figure 1  
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3 years early retirement
Steady increase in deferral  bonus from 1 to 3% per year 
between 1975 and 2000
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